Introduction
The Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations are structural in the evolution of the Brazilian international relations because of the political, economic, strategic and ideological weight that the U.S. holds on the country's agenda. This weight results from a complex combination of factors that involves the nature of the U.S. power resources, its projection capacity and Brazil's perception of itself and about such partner. This trend of the debate ideologization and internal polarization that breaks down into currents which are in favor or against an autonomous foreign policy, in opposition to the alignment with the U.S., has remained until the twenty-first century, going through the administration of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 Silva ( /2010 and reaching that of Dilma Rousseff (2011 Rousseff ( /2014 .
Whereas in the Lula administration the international assertiveness prevailed and raised Brazil's global presence, even facing the U.S. and despite criticism, Dilma Rousseff"s period seems to represent an inflection point in this process. Such difference would correspond to an attempt to reconcile the aspects of autonomy and alignment. Nonetheless, this process has proved to be quite orbit. Such criticisms had been high in the 2010 presidential elections, being focused on the Iran-Brazil-Turkey Tripartite Nuclear Agreement and the human rights theme, symbolized in the sentence of death by stoning of Sakineh Ashtiani by the Ahmadinejad government, which Brazil would not criticize (not taking into account the fact that the country was negotiating the pardon). Both matters were criticized by the United States and used by the opposition. In the post-2011 the Ashtiani theme vanished, and the United States, after its pressure for the non-approval of the Tripartite Agreement, closed a new nuclear deal with Iran, similar to that of 2010. The U.S. positions went against Turkey, too, and they reflect its shrinking in face of regional pivots.
The Dilma presidency began under the sign of compromising on controversial themes, with emphasis on the electoral conjuncture. Therefore, a possible hypothesis is that this tactical adjustment emerges more from an internal debate than from the need of repositioning to obtain U.S. recognition, since the perception of Brazil as a power already existed.
It was not a change in the policy of state but an adjustment in the policy of government. The appointment of former Brazilian Ambassador in Washington Antonio Patriota (2007 Patriota ( /2009 ) to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had previously been the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 in the final years of Ambassador Celso Amorim administration (2009/2010) , came up as an important element. The idea was to offer a counterpoint to the Lula administration for the domestic public, but one that could bring advantages, as the support to the permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. However, what was the status of the bilateral relation and which were the paths in the Dilma Rousseff administration?
When Rousseff took office in January 2011, the Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations were at a level of Strategic Dialogue. Established in 2005 by the administrations of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 Silva ( /2010 and George W. Bush (2001 Bush ( /2008 , the Strategic Dialogue represented the U.S. acknowledgement that Brazil laid in a new position in the world power balance. It was defined that the partnership held global implications and was not restricted to regional themes.
This did not reflect full convergence of interests or elimination of conflict, but rather a status of exchange between powers.
Despite the criticisms from pro-alignment groups towards President Lula, the very establishment of the Dialogue was only possible because of the change in foreign policy. Undertaken by President Lula and Ambassador Celso Amorim as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, changes allowed for the maturation and strenghten of the agenda through the resumption of the South-South cooperation and the Third-Worldism identity. The 1990s positions of subordination and alignment were dropped, recovering an autonomous vision and a development project.
The project has internal and external dimensions. Internally, the national power reinforcement was sought through economic adjustments to guarantee stability and growth and to reduce vulnerability. The government developed actions to correct social inequalities, for the technical cooperation potential and soft power: Fome Zero, Farmácia Popular and Bolsa Família. In the same referential is Brazil"s participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, also known as MINUSTAH, since 2004 as a leader.
The integration deepening in South America was observed (Southern Common Market-MERCOSUL, Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America-IIRSA, Union of South American Nations-UNASUL and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States-CELAC), as well as the active participation in multilateral negotiations in traditional organizations (United Nations, International Monetary Fund, , the creation of alliances of variable geometry among the emerging countries (India-Brazil-South Africa-IBSA; Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa-BRICS; , the reinforcement of extra-regional partnerships with the EU, and the resumption of a South-South policy in Africa, Asia and Middle East. The Summits of South American-Arab countries (ASPA, in Portuguese) and African-South American countries (ASA) were unprecedented signals.
Insofar as the United States did not take part in the twenty-first century regional integration arrangements, a counterpoint has been offered to the traditional Inter-American system created in the Cold War and based on strategic-military mechanisms, the 1947 TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) and the 1948 OAS (Organization of American States).
Such institutions became U.S. bridgehead from 1947 to 1989, and they were emptied by the South American initiatives.
This system and the U.S.-Cuba relations, characterized by the trade embargo in place since the 1959 Communist Revolution, demonstrate the freezing in regional policies. These policies were somewhat updated in the 1990s with the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that sought to establish the Hemispheric Free Trade Zone, without any alterations in the U.S. vision of the region as a "reserve zone". Among the proposed projects, the ones created were NAFTA, the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico (1994) , and CAFTA, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (2007), as well as bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Peru and Colombia were established.
The integration led by Brazil questioned the projects of asymmetric social and economic conditionalities (Washington Consensus). By rebuilding, and leading, changes in its regional surrounding and at global scale, Brazil made itself present in the world, with autonomous identity and interests. As mentioned above, this culminated in 2005 in the Strategic Dialogue and the definition of Brazil and other emerging countries as pillars of the new world order. In 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice considered the emerging countries as "stakeholders of the world order". To this term, it was added in 2010 that of the "new centers of global power", of President Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS-2010) .
Nevertheless, this scenario is not characterized only by the recognition of Brazil by the U.S., which takes the attempts of engagement by the hegemonic power. It is also marked by the crisis of this hegemony, provoked by George W. Bush: the military unilateralism and the intervention operations of the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) . This focus on the Eurasian system generated the imperial overextension and the 2008 economic crisis.
Besides the engagement, the containment of Brazil and other emerging countries became present with the criticisms towards the Brazilian and Chinese "neoimperialism" in the Third World, strategic measures in the military sector regarding areas as South America and Africa, and new economic alliances in Europe and the Pacific. Such movements unfolded: reinforcement of the existing mechanisms and creation of new projection instruments by Bush junior (and which were going to be completed by Barack Obama) .
In the first dimension, the reinforcement of mechanisms, is found the investment increase in Plan Colombia and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Specifically, the Plan Colombia of war on drugs was launched in the 2000s by the Bill Clinton administration (1993/2000) . The Andean Counterdrug Initiative 3 established the U.S.-Colombia cooperation in combating drug trafficking through aid and the military presence of U.S. troops on Colombian soil (including the cession of bases) and fumigation of coca crops in the Amazon region, with effects over all the countries that share it (as Brazil and Venezuela).
Since 2001, Plan Colombia incorporated the language of the Global War on Terrorism (GWT) with the definition of "narco-terrorism" as a threat to the hemispheric security. This classification was brought to identify a new threat category: the use of narco-trafficking money to finance terrorist groups. The launch of the Plan coincided with that of IIRSA, the project of infrastructure integration led by Brazil in South America, in a context of autonomy. Reinforced by the Lula administration, this project began in the late 1990s, mainly in the Andean region with the rise of the twenty-first century Socialism project of Chávez, with critical content towards the hegemony.
Classifications as "Rogue States" and "Axis of Evil" were applied in these situations, denoting the existence of authoritarian governments in the region, prone to disrespecting the norms of the international community (in the case of the Latin "Axis of Evil", Cuba and Venezuela were identified by the Department of State as the main risks) 4 . These perceptions were repudiated by the local diplomacies, demonstrating their concerns with the risk of interventionism, stressed by the launch of the Bush Doctrine of preemptive action in 2002. In the twenty-first century, the South Atlantic 5 , the area between South America and Africa, has regained its relevance for various reasons: gas and oil reserves, passing zone for raw materials and energy resources, and the growing Sino-Indo-Brazilian influence. The sum of Plan Colombia with the Fourth Fleet represents a relevant U.S. geopolitical move to project power where it had lesser strategic presence. These actions seek to provide a capacity for rapid deployment in the South Atlantic and collide with the Brazilian and African stance of demilitarization of the area. These different positions are not unprecedented, resuming the divergences of the 1980s regarding the creation of ZOPACAS (South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone), by Brazil, and the establishment of SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organization), by the U.S.
According to Brazil's White Paper on National Defense (2012), the South Atlantic, also known as the "Blue Amazon", is an area of high relevance for the country for the same reasons it is for the United States,
In the Brazilian maritime area, over the Atlantic Ocean, important navigation routes cross, which are vital to the national economy. There are the Brazilian presalt reserves, of high economic, political and strategic significance (...) The projection eastward leads to the West African countries, where the Cape route is highlighted, for being a considerable strategic way of communication of Asia and Africa with the Northern Hemisphere. The segment that extends from São Roque cape to the river Oiapoque projects Brazil to the northern portion of Africa, to Western Europe, Panama Canal, the Caribbean and Central and North America. (Ministério da Defesa 2012, n/p) In the geopolitical and geo-economic scope of South Atlantic, there is another U.S. action that is inserted in the new mechanisms of projection: the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2008. Formerly part of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the geographic area of this command overlaps in the South Atlantic the forces of the Southern Command, and, as its South American part, seeks to occupy spaces and deter SinoBrazilian and Indian advance in Africa. The motivation is similar to that of the Fourth Fleet reactivation.
Those are complementary efforts that represent the acknowledgement of the Brazilian force and its potential of threat. Independent of these moves, and parallel to and convergent with them, a solid base is built for the bilateral relation, sustained by these very factors. This is the complex level upon which the Dilma-Obama exchange is built: Brazil remained recognized as a power. So, why did the Dilma administration begin with attempts of tactical adjustment of the exchange?
Unlike other powers as China and India, which tend to deepen the bargain with the U.S. in the same proportion that their force rises, Brazil faces internal pro-alignment pressure that hampers consensus building around autonomy. Thus, as indicated, it was under Dilma that the tactical adjustment came up in 2011, in a context of relative decline in the diplomatic offensive. This movement began in President Barack Obama's visit to Brazil in March, which was for some internal groups considered "agenda clearing" (a vision propagated by the media). However, when Obama arrived in Brazil, he was visiting a country considered a global power in the twenty-first century context, the result of almost a decade of national strengthening rather than in response to the recent changes Dilma sought to implement after only two months of the administration.
What mattered most was the tactic to recover areas in the regional context, which could not be detached from the global: continuing economic crisis in the U.S. and European Union, strengthening of the emerging countries and their international geopolitical and geo-economic projection, deepening of the South American integration, instability in the Iraq-Afghanistan Eurasian military theaters and the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010. The actions in Latin America are compensatory, without moving the U.S. focus from Eurasia. While in Brazil, President Obama announced the beginning of the UNSCauthorized military operation into Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, for humanitarian reasons. The UNSC voting that authorized it was not consensual and showed a representative pattern of the new global forces: the countries that abstained were permanent and temporary Security Council members, China and Russia, Brazil, India and Germany. 6 What were the concrete results of the visit? And of the tactical adjustment? Regarding the visit's media content, a formal sponsorship to Brazil's insertion as a UNSC permanent member and the abolition of visas had no advances. Unlike India and Japan that rely on formal support statements, Brazil had one of "appreciation" only. Visas were kept, upon promise of facilitation.
There were changes in the 2005 Strategic Dialogue, with the elevation of its components to the presidential level. The goal was to signal that the relation was a priority and aggregate to the negotiations more visibility and diplomatic dimensions, placing them as a task of both Executives and agencies. This institutionalization defines greater regularity in meetings, making them permanent forums. The main dialogues are the Global Partnership Dialogue (GPD), the Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD), the Commission on Economic and Trade Relations, the Economic Partnership Dialogue, the Trade Partnership Dialogue and the Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED). They updated forums as the Brazil-U.S. Chambers of Commerce, as well as corporate forums (Brazil-U.S. Business Council) and of the civil society.
In the scope of the "Brazil-U.S. Global Partnership Dialogue" (GPD), priorities were defined as follows: Trilateral Cooperation, Education Cooperation, Space Cooperation, Cooperation for Social Inclusion, and Cooperation in the Health Area. Among these, the education cooperation was strongly represented by the Science Without Borders Program, sponsored by the Brazilian government and the funding agencies in the education sector at the level of research and undergraduate and graduate education, CNPq and CAPES, which aims to train Brazilian students in foreign institutions (Diálogo da Parceria Global, Brasil-Estados Unidos 2012).
Another growing area was that of trilateral cooperation, which establishes a joint action of Brazil and the U.S. in third countries especially in Central America, the Caribbean and Africa. The main programs developed concern food safety, fighting HIV/AIDS, fighting forced and children labor, cooperation in biofuels, the environment and conservation, and drug trafficking.
In 2011 Regarding the Strategic Energy Dialogue, the launch of the detailed program of energy cooperation defined four areas: biofuels, renewable energy and energy efficiency, oil and natural gas, and nuclear security. Since 2011, the meetings of the technical groups as well as the energy ministries have been frequent, without interruption. The United States pledged to work with Brazil on the achievement and formatting of the Rio+20 agenda, the 2012 conference on the environment.
One of the key elements of this energy partnership lies in the exploration of the Brazilian pre-salt and the concern with the increasing participation of Chinese companies in the process. Despite U.S. advances in the exploration of shale for generating gas and oil, touted as an "unconventional revolution" (Yergin 2014 ) that would make the country autonomous, the extension and environmental viability of this production remain in question. However, many claim that the use of shale, combined with the expansion of oil exploration in protected environmental areas such as Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico, can change the world geopolitical and geo-economic panorama with the disengagement of troops and investment in key areas.
The U.S. is interested in guaranteeing the access to the Brazilian presalt, since it would allow for an energy partnership with a "friendly country", which offers fewer risks than the scenarios of Middle East, Central Asia and Africa (and that of Venezuela in Latin America). The military-strategic risks are included here, as well as the strong Sino-Indian competition. Insofar as there is no change in the U.S. consumption patterns and energy supply, it is arguable that any new internal (or even external) source would meet the demand.
Defense and trade are other sectors in which the negotiations were kept. On the defense agenda, the innovation was the establishment of a strategic dialogue, which seeks to increase the joint training actions and threats identification. For the U.S. it is interesting to expand its exports in the military sector to Brazil and South America, hampering the development of technological autonomy, as well as the contacts with other nations that are active in this market. This dimension was accelerated upon the establishment of the CDS (Council of South American Defense) under UNASUL in 2008. CDS represented a qualitative leap forward in the South American security relations, composed of local countries only, aiming at cooperation and confidence building. It seeks to offer an alternative to its strategic repositioning, as Plan Colombia and the Fourth Fleet, as well as a way to contain and deter new attempts of military presence by the United States. Finally, it offers an autonomous regional mechanism to deal with security themes.
With regard to trade, the downward trends in the bilateral flow were kept since there was no move towards the opening of the U.S. market or correction of protectionist and subsidy mechanisms. The interactions at the WTO and the locking of the Doha Round exemplify these dimensions, in addition to various contentions between both diplomacies. Some disputes as that of the orange juice are recurrent, whereas the contention on cotton has remained unsolved since 2002. In 2009 the WTO authorized Brazil to levy up to US$ 829 million in retaliation against the U.S., a decision which was rejected by the United States, which appealed and lost. In 2011 the United States agreed to pay Brazil's Cotton Institute US$ 147.3 million annually to compensate those figures and reform its Farm Bill, only to, soon after, suspend the payments in October 2013. Brazil's option was, in 2014, to set up a panel to press for the agreement implementation and the Farm Bill revision.
Moreover, there was the dissonance in the WTO presidential election in which a coalition of Southern countries managed to elect Ambassador Roberto Azevedo in 2013, opposing the U.S.-backed candidate. A comparative analysis of Brazilian trade flows in the last five years, focusing on the Brazil-U.S. and Brazil-China bilateral partnerships, demonstrates that there have not been significant changes despite the Global Dialogues (see Table 1 ). The same blocking occurs at the G20 negotiations, which gained greater visibility after the 2008 global financial crisis. Although negotiations started at an intense pace after the crisis outbreak, they have been emptied in the last years due to the maintenance of U.S. and European unilateralism in the face of emerging countries' demands of adjustment of the economic agenda of recovery and reform of financial institutions. There remains a detachment between the policies of regulation and adjustment demanded by the emerging countries and the agenda of the North. This detachment must be seen as one of the reasons for the strengthening of South-South alliances such as the BRICS. In July 2014, the creation of the BRICS bank demonstrated the strength of this organization.
Furthering this panorama, the Obama administration intensified, and complemented, this process of containing the emerging countries started by Bush junior. To the positive rhetoric of cooperation, a more aggressive one was added:
Countries like China, India, and Brazil are growing by leaps and bounds. We should welcome this development, for it has lifted hundreds of millions from poverty (...) and created new markets and opportunities (...). And yet, as this rapid change has taken place, it has become fashionable in some quarters to question whether the rise of these nations will accompany the decline of American and European influence around the world. Perhaps, the argument goes, these nations represent the future, and the time for our leadership has passed. That argument is wrong. The time for our leadership is now. It was the United States (...) and our democratic allies that shaped a world in which new nations could emerge. (Obama 2011a, n/p) There have been many allegations of a "new imperialism" against the emerging countries, be it Chinese (as in the words of former Secretary of State Clinton about the China-Africa relation) or Brazilian as aforementioned. Brazil has been accused of human rights violations and exploitation in economic activities in Africa and South America. The action of companies as Odebrecht, Petrobras, among others, has been the subject of numerous external criticisms. This offensive has been intensified, since both China and Brazil increased their power projection on both continents. Such criticisms are incorporated in the internal debate.
The rhetorical offensive was accompanied by the actions of USSOUTHCOM/USAFRICOM, as well as by land military projection in South America. Obama has incorporated two containment initiatives, the Asian pivot and the European pivot, of economic and military character. The Asian pivot strategy presented in 2011, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), restructures the economic relations of the United States with Asia, bringing pressure to the Sino-Indian activities (and trying to revitalize the Japanese-American alliance), and which affects South America in its Pacific zone. There was a readjustment of military troops in USPACOM. The United States supports the establishment of the Pacific Alliance in South America, composed of Chile, Peru, Mexico and Colombia, aiming to distance these nations from the integration projects of UNASUL/MERCOSUL.
The European pivot, the Transatlantic Partnership, launched in 2013, establishes negotiations for a free trade zone between the United States and the European Union. It seeks to close the room for the emerging countries in both markets. For Brazil, it relativizes even more its importance on its partners' agenda and brings obstacles to the ongoing negotiations of the MERCOSULEuropean Union Trade Agreement.
With or without dialogue, U.S. standards have not changed. Even so, in 2012, President Dilma visited the United States and, once again, the interaction was touted as evidence of a new bilateral stage. In 2012, there were no advances in Rio+20, which did not enjoy the expected U.S. support. The announcement in 2013 that the President would be received, in October, as Head of State in Washington only raised these expectations, particularly in the pro-alignment sectors that defended the hypothesis of a break in the Lula-Dilma continuum.
However, there was no break: what prevailed was a tactical adjustment towards accommodation. If there was reduction in conflict, it derived from the relative retreat of diplomacy, which, in principle, reduced the areas of tension. This does not mean that there was convergence between Brazil and the United States in the areas of previous disagreements, but it rather means that the country was less visible.
Detachment, Rethinking and Stagnation (2013/2014)
From the 2011/2012 assessment, a "positive" year of 2013 was expected; however, the detachment of the structural and conjunctural dimensions of the relation was going to become more complex and sharp. The short-term visions overlapped the analyses of exchange, reducing it to the spying theme given the accusations of Edward Snowden published by journalist Glen Greenwald in June 2013. These reports indicated that the U.S. maintained a regular practice of espionage conducted by their National Security Agency (NSA). The justification remained that of safety, aimed at combating transnational terrorism. However, the NSA watched enemy nations and allied countries like Brazil and Germany (including President Dilma and Chancellor Angela Merkel) and companies in which the U.S. held interest, as energy-sector Petrobras .
Although one cannot deny the seriousness of the allegations, the Snowden case took much larger and media proportions than it should have. In different proportions, it assumed a central role in the domestic agenda as the Ahstiani case had, and the tendency is to follow suit in terms of emptying. The cancellation of the visit of President Dilma as Head of State to the United States, scheduled for October 2013, was cited as evidence of conflict. Moreover, almost all foreign policy decisions or economic issues involving the United States somehow became attributable to the Snowden case. This ignored the context in Brazil and the United States in which the NSA outcry arose, as well as the institutionalization of bilateral relations.
Examining this context, and chronologically the relation dynamics of from June 2013 to 2014, when Vice President Joe Biden came to Brazil in the World Cup to meet with President Dilma, we can observe that the Snowden affair represented a strong smoke screen. Although this screen was instrumental to both countries, it cannot be turned into the "trigger" of what happened.
Snowden's allegations were not unprecedented, just take the WikiLeaks case. In 2010 the site of Julian Assange released similar information. Snowden keeps stating that he has requested political asylum in Brazil, which would not have been granted by the government. In turn, the government denies this request to be official. In any case, this episode shows that the government does not want to confront the U.S. interest. As of August 2014, this issue is still pending. Why did the Snowden case reach such repercussions?
With regard to the United States, the fact that the accusations would have been payable to the Obama administration represented the differential due to the condemnation by Democrats of these practices. For Brazil, the allegations called into question the prior tactical adjustment advocated by proalignment groups, and emerged at a time of relative crisis. The months of June and July 2013 were characterized by a wave of protests in major Brazilian cities as of the Confederations Cup (with the movement "there won't be Cup").
These protests, especially in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, had been occurring since January, for various reasons: free bus services, anti-political parties and anti-corruption sentiment, homeless and landless movements, etc.
In 2014, the FIFA World Cup took place and protests were further restricted, without broad popular participation. From the beginning, the segmentation of agendas and the violence of the Black Blocs indicated that the reach of antigovernment demonstrations was low, evidencing the movement's lack of identity and the media utilization by the opposition. In this context, the Snowden case came as a relief valve, aiming to support and create facts for a new tactical adjustment and the resumption of political initiative.
In August September and October were marked by the creation of new facts: the Snowden crisis led Brazil, in alliance with Germany, to take a leadership role in criticizing the espionage and the demand for the regulation of digital media. The subject occupied the central place of the President's Statement at the Opening of the 68th General Assembly of the United Nations, with strong criticism against the United States (Rousseff 2013).
In Brazil, the situation was even more serious, as it emerged that we were targeted by this intrusion. Personal data of citizens was intercepted indiscriminately. Corporate information -often of high economic and even strategic value -was at the center of espionage activity. Also, Brazilian diplomatic missions, among them the Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the Office of the President of the Republic itself, had their communications intercepted. Tampering in such a manner in the affairs of other countries is a breach of International Law and is an affront to the principles that must guide the relations among them, especially among friendly nations. A sovereign nation can never establish itself to the detriment of another sovereign nation. The right to safety of citizens of one country can never be guaranteed by violating fundamental human rights of citizens of another country. (...) We expressed to the Government of the United States our disapproval, and demanded explanations, apologies and guarantees that such procedures will never be repeated. (...) For this reason, Brazil will present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet and to ensure the effective protection of data that travels through the web (...) (Rousseff 2013, n/p) This resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly, in December, of the "Right to privacy in the digital age" resolution. This theme became symbolic since Dilma had not presented innovations in the history of foreign policy until then, keeping Lula's initiatives. Therefore, the espionage theme was exploited (its domestic counterpart was the Marco Civil da Internet, an Internet bill of rights, approved in 2014) . But what about the Brazilian decisions in the second half of 2013 that were touted as a result of the Snowden affair and which reflect long-term strategic issues? There are two cases worth highlighting: the purchase of fighter jets for the Brazilian Air Force and the auction of the Libra pre-salt field.
Started under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, the studies for the purchase of the jets had a long trajectory affected by budgetary and strategic (access to technology) issues, which resulted in three options: Rafalle-France, Boeing-United States and Gripen-Sweden. Quite delayed, the decision occurred only in 2013, on an emergency basis, and after the deactivation of the national fleet. The option was for the purchase of the Swedish GRIPEN NG-SAAB jet, in a contract valued at US$ 4.5 billion. According to analyst Roberto Godoy,
The choice of the Swedish Gripen NG will enable the development of a highperformance national fighter jet -a supersonic with BR designer, created to meet specific demands of the Brazilian military aviation. According to the Defense Minister, Celso Amorim, such aircraft may be exported. It is the main benefit of the proposal of Saab, which also took advantage at the time of closing the deal: it won the contract for US$ 4.5 billion, the lowest budget of the three finalists, covering the supply of 36 aircraft, parts, components and, of course, the fourth-generation technology required by the Air Force at large scale. That means a lot. With the knowledge incorporated by the joint program, Embraer -the main aerospace agency in the country and designated as Saab's partner -may in the future offer a new product in the military market. (...) The announcement of the choice does not preclude the immediate crisis of the air defense. (Godoy 2013, n/p) This decision, as well as the partnership with France in the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB), in association with the Brazilian Navy, is part of a process of modernization of the Armed Forces accelerated by the Lula administration. This process aims to restore the defense sector, after its dismantling over the 1990s (initiated by Fernando Collor de Mello). Despite the establishment of the Brazil-U.S. Defense Dialogue, the choices in the industry have been the diversification of partnerships with developed and emerging countries, be it for the purchase of equipment and the development of research, or for training and joint operations (see IBSAMAR). This concerns the United States and the partnership with China is mentioned in the 2014 USSOUTHCOM strategic posture,
In the defense realm, Chinese technology companies are partnering with Venezuela, Brazil, and Bolivia to launch imagery and communications satellites, and China is gradually increasing its military outreach, offering educational exchanges with many regional militaries. In 2013, the Chinese Navy conducted a goodwill visit in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina and conducted its first-ever naval exercise with the Argentine Navy. (USSOUTHCOM 2014, 11) The concern is extended to the pre-salt exploration. Regarding this agenda, the Brazilian approach has been the same: the diversification of partnerships, and the search for conditions to ensure greater benefits to the Brazilian state. In 2013, the auction of the Libra Field was representative of this tactic when the consortium formed by Petrobras, Shell (Netherlands), Total (France), CNPC and CNOOC (China) acquired the right to explore the field, with parcel to Brazil as well as bonus by the concession contract. The nonparticipation of Anglo-Saxon companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron, British Petroleum and BG was pointed out as a result of the unwillingness of the Brazilian government with its U.S. counterpart because of the Snowden case, ignoring the fact that these companies did not consider the proposed sharing system interesting enough. The perception of the energy problem is, as stated previously, a factor that involves hemispheric and African dimensions, regarding the advance of the emerging countries in the South Atlantic. In 2014, it becomes evident on both the USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM agendas, The African continent"s energy and strategic mineral reserves are also of growing significance to China, India, and other countries in the broader Indian Ocean Basin. Africa"s increasing importance to allies and emerging powers, including China, India, and Brazil, provides opportunities to reinforce U.S. security objectives in other regions through our engagement on the continent. While most African countries prefer to partner with the United States across all sectors, many will partner with any country that can increase their security and prosperity. We should be deliberate in determining where we leave gaps others may fill. (AFRICOM Posture Statement 2014, 5) Vice-President Joe Biden mentioned the energy theme on a trip to Brazil in June 2014:
It is obvious that the potential of cooperation between Brazil and the United States in energy is great. Since the creation of the Brazil-U.S. Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED) in 2011, we have worked on major challenges in energy and climate change. In fact, the SED was formed upon a bilateral cooperation in biofuel, hydrocarbon and civil nuclear energy, to name a few that already existed. That is, our partnership in energy is already some years old. The U.S. oil companies have been active in the oil and gas industry in deep waters in Brazil for many years, while Petrobras has a history of deep-water operations in the United States. This is an area that each country can contribute with expertise and can benefit from bilateral technical and commercial engagement. What we have learned from the partnership in the SED is that U.S. service companies are eager to explore partnership opportunities for the development of oil and gas reserves in Brazil, including nonconventional ones. (Lopes 2014) Held during the World Cup in 2014, this visit was defined by the Vice President in an interview with Folha de São Paulo as a "date" between both diplomacies, but he underscored that the "worst moments" of the NSA espionage post-crisis had been overcome. 7 Biden stressed that these noises did not prevent the continuation of the dialogue, as well as agendas of cooperation and business related to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. Programs like Science Without Borders were highlighted. In a similar tone, President Dilma Rousseff, in an interview analysed by O Globo on July 10, 2014 stated: I do not believe that the responsibility for the habits of espionage is of the Obama administration. I think it is a process that has been occurring since September 11. What we did not accept and still do not is the fact that the Brazilian government, Brazilian companies and Brazilian citizens were spied (...) (Alencastro 2014, n/p) The Biden-Rousseff statements mean there is interest to change the focus. These efforts have their motivations, including instrumental ones: on the U.S. side, repositioning on the agenda; for Brazil, to eliminate a subject of contestation of foreign policy in the 2014 presidential campaign by the opposition. The tactic is unlikely to succeed, since the pro-alignment groups have a clear stance: either there is a structural change or criticisms remain. Therefore, the question refers not to the government policy, but the state policy.
The bilateral relations from 2011 to 2014 express the traditional contradictions of this interaction and its weight in domestic politics, such as the U.S. hegemonic power in the quest to preserve its regional and global power. Brazil's strengthening emphasized its autonomy, which led to a new U.S. perception about the possibilities of cooperation or threats arising from this growth. This increased contacts, elevating conflicts.
The United States retreated internationally due to the economic crisis and reinforced the use of strategic and military mechanisms in the pressure on Brazil and emerging countries. Ideological instruments and the reaffirmation of zones of influence in the Pacific and in Europe, as well as the creation of new areas of power projection in Eurasia and Africa offer a counterpoint to regional powers. Moreover, concerns about terrorism and drugs remain:
Clan-based, Lebanese Hezbollah-associated criminal networks exploit free trade zones and permissive areas in places like Venezuela, and the Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay Tri-Border to engage in money laundering and other illegal endeavors, as well as recruitment and radicalization efforts. (…) (USSOUTHCOM Posture Command 2014, p. 4) Working with our interagency colleagues and international partners, we will assist as appropriate in countering diversified illicit drug trafficking and transnational criminal organization networks in Latin America that are expanding in size, scope, and influence. The Department will continue to maximize the impact of U.S. presence in Latin America by continuing to foster positive security relationships with our partners to maintain peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. (Department of Defense 2014) Thus, we are confronted with a complex picture of socio-political, economic and strategic considerations that guide the bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States in regional and global terms. Such relations are also inserted into a broader framework of transformation in the balance of world power.
Final Considerations
As discussed throughout the text, the government of President Dilma Rousseff has elements of both continuity and discontinuity when compared to that of President Lula. Although there is a continuity of an internal and external project of state, retreats on agendas such as the bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States indicate some discontinuity, associated with a lower external intensity. This was the tone of the first two years of the administration between 2011 and 2012, and which was extended to regional and multilateral organizations.
Particularly in bilateral trade with the United States, these tactical adjustments do not impact the structural dimensions analyzed here, particularly in the U.S. strategic interest in containing the advance of Brazil (or any other emerging country). Moreover, they may lead to the risk of weakening the Brazilian position. Since 2013/2014, the resumption of assertiveness introduced a path correction to this readjustment, which, although it has generated new controversy with the United States and the defenders of alignment, signaled a commitment to autonomy.
These oscillations of the Rousseff administration fall into a vision of state, under discussion in Brazil, which is not limited to international relations. Foreign policy and its definition from the perspective of bilateral relation is a component that is present even in the twenty-first century despite all the changes in the country, the United States and the world. A realistic relation with the United States passes through this assessment, and without it, no
